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Abstract 
This study uses data of “Chinese Household Income Project Survey 2002” to 
investigate long-term impact of Mao’s persistent policy of “forced/involuntary 
ruralisation of urban youth” (shangshan xiaxiang, literally “re-settlement in 
mountains and villages”) during the 1950s and 70s on women’s labour market 
participation and contribution to family incomes. Our results indicate that the 
impact of Mao’s forced ruralisation on female labour market participation can be 
positive (despite diminishing in size due to ageing). In addition, a change from 
positive to negative impact is largely determined by personal hardship under 
Maoism and its aftermath. Moreover, regarding female contribution to family 
incomes, our findings suggest that forcefully ruralised urban women have more 
bargaining power later in family finance.  
 
Our conclusion is that against all the odds Mao’s “forced ruralisation of urban 
youth” has improved family and societal positions of female victims in the post-
Mao era as an unintended consequence of Maoism. 
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A. Introduction 
The forced or involuntary ruralisation of urban youth scheme (shangshan xiaxiang, 
literally “re-settlement in mountains) in China lasted for three decades from the 
1950s throughout the 70s. According to official data, there were in total 17 million 
young students were “sent down” from cities to the countryside often thousands 
kilometres away (National Statistical Bureau, 1987), in the name of “re-education 
by the poor and lower-middle peasants” (jieshou pinxiazhongnong zai jiaoyu). This 
scheme forcefully uprooted large numbers of urban youth from their homes and 
schools to resettle them in rural regions and embark on physical toil regardless of 
the age of the victims. By definition, a large proportion of these youngsters became 
child labourers. In this context, Mao’s scheme brutally altered fate as well as mind 
of one generation’s urban youth in China. 
 
So far, there has been only one study that compares two genders among the 
resettled urban youth (Booth et al. 2018) to see the impact of Mao’s policy on that 
the forced ruralised urban youth. It is thus a topic that has so far been overlooked.  
 
According to the published data of “Chinese Household Income Project Survey 
2002”, urban women who were subject to the forced ruralisation scheme (“FRS” 
thereafter) in their school age have had a high labour market participation rate 
although their participation diminishes with ageing. Such data allow us to seek 
for a more quantitative revelation regarding the change in female social and 
economic status in the aftermath of Mao’s involuntary scheme of forced 
ruralisation by looking at (1) female labour market participation and (2) female 
contribution to family incomes. 
 
Meanwhile, OLS regressions and Heckman two-stage method that we have 
adopted indicate that the same female group commands a larger share of their 
family incomes than their counterparts who did not have the FRS experience. 
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Moreover, this study measures the exogenous shock effect on female labour 
market participation rate and identifies a positive relationship between the degree 
of hardship in the countryside endured by FRS victims and the rate of female 
labour market participation later in life. 
 
Our contribution is two-fold: Firstly, instead of accepting what has been said by 
China’s official media, we probe scale and scope of women’s emancipation in Mao 
and post-Mao’s China. Secondly, instead of looking at a linear growth pattern we 
investigate a vulnerable group of urban girls/women to see how political 
misfortune was turned around by individuals with conscious choices once 
inhuman conditions were reversed. 
 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: Part B reviews the existing literature; 
Part C is devoted to survey data; Part D contains empirical analysis; Part E draws 
final conclusions. 
 
 
B. Review of literature 
Ruralisation of urban youth in Mainland China began in the 1950s as a national 
policy. But, from 1955 to 1966, the scale of it was relatively limited. During the 
decade-long “Cultural Revolution” (1966-76), it accelerated to every urban 
household under the direct order of Mao Zedong (1893-1976) as a compulsory state 
policy. In Mao’s own glorious phrase, “It is vastly necessary for urban young people 
to resettle in the countryside to received re-education from the poor and lower-
middle peasants.” A tsunami of urban youth resettling in rural China soon 
followed. This round, over 15 million school-aged urban youngsters were forced to 
leave their homes, care-takers, and schools on a punitive journey to be de-educated 
and impoverished in name of re-education in China’s poorest and the most 
backward sector where life was harsh and unforgiving. This was an exogenous 
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shock to the urban population. Why? Life was too comfy in cities; being comfy 
meant bourgeois; being bourgeois meant anti-revolutionary – that was according 
to Mao’s restless mind.4 
 
A range of works on FRS has been produced. In terms of collective behaviour, 
Meng and Gregory (2002) and Han, Wing and Zhang (2011) observed how the 
imposed de-education incentivized the victims to invest in their own education 
once schooling was allowed later in life. Similarly, Liu Yuan (2016) investigated 
how interrupted schooling suffered by the bygone urban youth influenced victims’ 
behaviour towards their own children’s education which directly contrasts to the 
group’s frugality towards consumer goods (Li et al., 2010; Fan, 2017). So, some 
types of compensation are highly visible among the FRS generation. 
 
In terms of direct consequences, studies show a range of issues with the FRS 
victims including low incomes (Xie, Jiang and Greenman, 2008; Yang Juan and Li 
Shi, 2011;  Peng Shuhong, 2016); poor health, commonly below the societal par 
(Gong, Lu and Xie, 2014), a strong feeling of unhappiness (Qian and Hodson, 2011; 
Peng Shuhong, 2016), delayed and low-quality marriages (Song and Zheng, 2016; 
Wang and Zhou, 2017), and a lack of trustworthiness in society (Liang and Li, 
2014).  
 
Unlike most works that have lumped women and men under FRS together, 
Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) and Jayachandran (2008) argued that the impact 
of external shocks such as globalization and natural disasters might differ 
between the two genders. Indeed, an empirical research conducted by Booth et al. 
(2018) revealed that the Cultural Revolution made Chinese women in general 
                                                 
4 Chen et al. (2018) showed that the half-educated urban youth effective upgraded rural human 
capital. So, it was poor peasants that were on the receiving end of education, against what Mao 
wished to achieve. 
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more competitive and risk-taking than their Cultural Revolution-free 
counterparts. But the impact on FRS women has remained unknown. This is 
where we begin.  
 
This research probes in two dimensions: (1) female labour market participation 
rates, and (2) female contribution to family incomes. China’s female labour market 
participation rate has high by the world standard (Pan Jintang, 2002). Studies 
show that three factors led to this high rate. The first is the ideological promotion 
of female rights by state policies (Pan Jintang, 2002; Liu Weifang, 2010); the 
second, market demand for labour especially during post -Mao reforms towards 
marketisation (Li et al., 2005; Yao and Tan, 2005; Li and Li, 2008); and the third, 
a rise in costs of living and the tradition of kin obligations (Alesina and Giuliano, 
2010; Zhang Chuanchuan, 2011; Shen Ke et al., 2012; Xiong and Li, 2016). 
However, no study has taken traumatisation caused by compulsory family 
separation and schooling suspension for a rural labour camp into account of the 
female employment pattern. Regarding family incomes, studies show that the 
status and bargaining power inside household matter (Qi Liangshu, 2005; Zhang 
and Tsang, 2012; Bertrand, 2015). But very few have linked trauma to individual 
contribution to family incomes.  
 
It can be assumed that individuality can be change by political trauma such as 
FRS. For example, a comparative study of urban women subject to the Cultural 
Revolution in Beijing vis-à-vis their counterparts of males in Beijing, females in 
Taipei, and a younger generation in Beijing concluded that the urban women with 
the Cultural Revolution in Beijing are more competitive (Booth et al., 2018). Gong, 
Lu and Xie (2017) discovered the victims became more self-reliant after their 
family ties were artificially severed by FRS. However, either study investigates 
female labour market participation rate or female contribution to family incomes 
associated with FRS. 
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C. Data and methodology 
Based on available survey data, we calibrate female labour market participation 
rate and female contribution to family incomes as results of changed female 
individuality to see the impact of by FRS on women’s emancipation in China. 
 
C.1. Data 
Our data come from “Chinese Household Income Project Survey 2002” which 
covers 22 out of China’s 28 provinces.5 We use the data for the urban nuclear 
families (husband, wife and children) to unveil the impact of FRS on women’s 
emancipation in modern China.  
 
Our procedure is as follows: (1) to identify 6,741 wives, 6,514 husbands, and 5,854 
children, (2) to match families and yield 6,416 married couples, and (3) to match 
these couples with their 5,530 children. In addition, we match grandparents with 
these nuclear families to see home influence on FRS women. We apply clustered 
standard deviation on the family level to eliminate interplay among siblings of 
FRS women.6 We also control the age group by dates of birth between 1937 and 
1966 (aged between 37 and 64).7 This makes a sample of a total of 3,812 married 
women with an average of 46.3 years old. Of them, 924 were victims of FRS, or 24 
percent of the sample. Sixty-three percent of them have paid jobs. They contribute 
48 percent to their family incomes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 This project collected random samples of household employment, health, incomes, and 
propensities. 
6 This is similar to the work by Zuoteng and Li, 2008.  
7 Mao announced in 1955 “Countryside is a vast platform where much can be achieved” which 
ushered in the forced ruralisation scheme. The scheme was officially called off in 1978 after Mao 
died. The youngest FRS victims were 12 years old; and the oldest, 18. Thus, the dates of birth can 
be set between 1937 (1955-18=1937) and 1966 (1978-12=1966). 
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C.2. Variables and statistical data  
We set the following: (1) Female labour market participation rate is a dependent 
variable. We use a dummy to show employment status: the value for those who 
are currently employed is 1; otherwise, 0. (2) Contribution to family incomes is 
also a dependent variable. To measure female income contribution, we adopt 
lnYwife / (lnYwife + lnYhusband). (3) FRS experience is another dummy: she who was 
ruralised has the value 1; otherwise, 0. (4) Female personal qualities, including 
age and years of education, make a control variable. (5) Husband’s personal 
qualities make another control variable, including age gap with wives and years 
of education. (6) Parenting burden is the third control variable. It refers to genders 
of children (boy = 1, girl = 0), children’s schooling (pre-school age = 1, primary 
school age = 0), and children’s senior high schooling (up to senior high = 1, 
otherwise = 0). (7) Family finance is the last control variable which counts for 
wife’s income of the previous year and husband’s income of the current year. The 
behaviours of these variables are displayed in Tables 1 and 2.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Our regressions use the logarithmic value. For presentation purposes, though, data in Tables 1 
and 2 are not in logarithm. 
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Table 1. General Information of Statistical Data 
Variable N Mean p50 Sd Min Max 
Female labour market participation 3812  0.630  1 0.480   0  1 
Contribution to family incomes 3812  0.480  0.490 0.110   0  1 
Ruralised 3812  0.240  0 0.430   0  1 
Duration of ruralisation 3812  1  0 2.290   0 30 
Woman age 3812 46.28 46 6.330  37 64 
Woman schooling (years) 3812 10.12 10 3.020   0 23 
Male offspring 3812  0.530  1 0.500   0  1 
Offspring with primary schooling  3812  0.0200  0 0.150   0  1 
Offspring with up to senior high 
schooling  3812  0.520  1 0.500   0  1 
Spouse’s age difference 3812  2.090  2 2.660  -9 22 
Husband’s education (years) 3812 10.80 11 3.110   0 23 
Husband’s current year incomes 3812 11799 10000 8299   0 100000 
Female’s previous year incomes 3812 7919 6575 6204   0 95000 
 
Table 2. Statistical Data for FRS Women and their Non-FRS Counterparts 
Variable 
FRS Non-Ruralised t Test 
N Mean Sd N Mean Sd Mean diff9 
LPR 926  0.600 0.490 2886  0.640  0.480  0.04** 
CFI 926  0.490 0.110 2886  0.480  0.110 -0.01*** 
FR 926  1 0 2886  0  0 -1 
DCR 926  4.110 2.970 2886  0  0.100 -4.11*** 
WA 926 47.89 3.850 2886 45.76  6.860 -2.13*** 
WS 926 10.58 2.540 2886  9.970  3.140 -0.61*** 
MO 926  0.510 0.500 2886  0.540  0.500  0.0300 
OPS 926  0.0200 0.130 2886  0.0200  0.150  0.0100 
OSH 926  0.450 0.500 2886  0.540  0.500  0.09*** 
SAG 926  1.720 2.400 2886  2.210  2.730  0.49*** 
HSY 926 10.76 10.00 2886 10.82 11.00  0.06 
HCI 926 11994 8134 2886 11736 8352 -257.7 
WPI 926 8419 5902 2886 7759 6291 -660.42*** 
 
Notes: (1) ***, **, * at 1%, 5%, 10% significant levels, respectively. (2) LPR - Labour participation 
rate; CFI – Contribution to family incomes; FR – Forced ruralisation; DFR – Duration of forced 
ruralisation; WA – Woman age; WS – Woman schooling (years); MO – Male offspring; OPS – 
Offspring at primary schooling age; OSH – Offspring with up to senior high schooling; SAG – 
Spouse’s age gap; HSY – Husband’s schooling (years); HCI – Husband’s current year income; 
WPI – Woman previous year income. 
                                                 
9 Non-ruralised women mean = urban women mean.  
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It turns out that the FRS group commands a higher share in family incomes at 49 
percent versus 48 percent for the non-ruralised counterparts as well as for the 
overall average. But the group has 60 percent of labour market participation rate, 
lower than eight the female average (63 percent) or the non-ruralised group (64 
percent). Our explanation is that the FRS group faced retirement age during the 
survey.10  
 
 
D. Empirical modelling and test 
D.1. Impact of ruralisation on female labour market participation 
Our empirical model is established as: 
 
              (1) 
 
Where denotes womani partaking in labour market; is a key dummy 
variable to capture FRS experience of womani; agei, an age viable which influences 
employment; X, a combined control variable that includes women’s age, education, 
gender and age of children, previous year income, husband’s current year income, 
and a location dummy; , a random disturbance term.  
 
Between the two common choices of modelling – the linear probability model and 
nonlinear probability model (either logit or probit) – we opt for the former simply 
because it is better suited for evaluating partial effect. We nevertheless report 
probit result as a supplement to capture marginal effect to insure the robustness 
of our results. Table 3 contains our regression results for Model 1. Columns (1), (2) 
                                                 
10 Age matters, see Booth et al. (2018), and Gong, Lu and Xie (2017) argued that, although FRS 
trigged personal endeavour for success, personal competitiveness declined with age. 
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and (3) contain personal qualities, family burden and family finance, respectively; 
Column (4) is for robustness test with a probit approach.  
 
Table 3. Impact of FRS on Female Labour Market Participation Rate 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variable OLS OLS OLS Probit 
     
FR 0.684*** 0.658*** 0.735*** 0.398** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) 
FR•Age -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.008** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
WA -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.032*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
WS  0.031*** 0.032*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MO  0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
OPS  0.044 0.043 0.005 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
OSH  0.030** 0.033** 0.019 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HCI   -0.014** -0.011* 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
WPI   0.055*** 0.051*** 
   (0.00) (0.01) 
Location 
dummy 
Y Y Y Y 
_cons 2.037*** 1.994*** 1.767*** 4.424*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.40) 
N 3812 3812 3812 3812 
R2/Pseudo 
R2   
  0.324 0.324 0.365 0.3297 
 
Notes: (1) ***, **, * at 1%, 5%, 10% significant levels, respectively. Figures within brackets are 
family-level clustered robust standard errors. (2) FR – Forced ruralisation; WA – Woman age; WS 
– Woman schooling (years); MO – Male offspring; OPS – Offspring at primary schooling age; OSH 
– Offspring with up to senior high schooling; HCI – Husband’s current year income; WPI – Woman 
previous year income.  
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Now, taking a partial derivative with = 0.735 + (-0.015)*  
(Column 3), we obtain the threshold value at 49 years of age, meaning that those 
who were younger than 49 in 2002 (hence born after 1952) FRS produced positive 
effect on their labour market participation and those who were older than 49 in 
2002 (born before 1952) FRS produced negative effect on their labour market 
participation. Moreover, the higher the education level, the higher the labour 
market participation rate. Furthermore, those who raise children up to senior high 
schooling have higher labour market participation. This is however not obvious in 
the probit model. Finally, the higher the incomes for women, the higher the labour 
market participation by them; but the higher the husbands’ incomes, the lower the 
labour market participation by women. Of the four findings, the factor of FRS is 
what we are interested in. We argue that FRS made urban women more 
determined, independent and self-reliant, which was translated into more labour 
market participation, ceteris paribus. Such a result is compatible with several 
other studies.11  
 
D.1.1. Shocks and heterogeneity 
Our next issue is whether FRS hardship also had any impact. China’s 2002 
Household Income Project contains useful information of FRS victims’ family 
political status, namely “good/bad families” and (2) “loyal/disloyal families”. 12 
Evidently, women from “good families” were less likely to become victims of FRS 
than their “bad family” counterparts. Moreover, being from “good families” and 
                                                 
11 Gong, Lu and Xie (2017) argued that FRS victims believed in personal effort and personal skills 
through education instead of one’s family background or luck. Moreover, Semykin and Linz (2007), 
Heineck and Anger (2010), Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006), Borghans et al. (2008) all argued 
that those who believe in personal effort often fetch higher incomes. 
12 Political lineage went rampant during the Cultural Revolution with the assertion that political 
alignment and loyalty were heritable. It was the rationality for society-wide and caste-like political 
discrimination in education, employment and promotion, see Liu Xiaomeng, 1995. “Good families” 
were typically associated with three castes: “revolutionary cadres,” “poor peasants” and 
“proletarians”.  
12  
“loyal families” effectively shortened the duration of individuals staying in the 
countryside under FRS (see Table 4).13  
 
Table 4. Woman Family Status and FRS Suffering 
Type FRS chance FRS duration 
“Good family” 0.178 3.99 
“Bad family” 0.246 4.461 
Father as CCP member* 0.186 3.634 
Father as a non-CCP member 0.192 4.333 
 
Note: CCP -  Chinese Communist Party. * Parents’ membership of the ruling communist party is 
a proxy of good/loyal family status. 
 
Here, to see FRS impact in relation to victims’ family backgrounds, 14  our 
regressions are set to reveal a possible link between family backgrounds, i.e. socio-
political stratification (Sato and Li,2007) or parent party memberships (Li et 
al.,2007), and victims’ personal ability. We then factor the two family status 
variables in our regression. In Table 5, Columns (1) and (2) refer to the “good/bad” 
categories, respectively; and Columns (3) and (4), the “loyal/disloyal” categories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13  Zhou and Hou (1999), Qian and Hodson (2011) revealed that those who had the party-
membership family background stayed in the rural sector shorter than their counterparts.  
14 Available data, such as CFPS2010 (or “China’s Family Panel Studies 2010”) and CHARLS 2014 
(or “China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study”), do not offer enough information for 
regressions. We thus push victims’ age further back for empirical analysis without sacrificing the 
accuracy of results. 
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Table 5. Impact of Family Status on Labour Market Participation Rate of Female 
FRS Victims  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Good family Bad family Loyal family 
(CCP father) 
Disloyal 
family (Non-
CCP father) 
FR  1.130***  0.585*  0.658**  1.182*** 
  (0.21)  (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.20) 
FR•Age -0.024*** -0.012* -0.015** -0.024*** 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
WA -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.020*** -0.030*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
WS  0.023***  0.023***  0.023***  0.021*** 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
MO -0.019 0.037 -0.015 -0.004 
  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
OPS -0.091*** -0.157*** -0.039 -0.121*** 
  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
OSH  0.078***  0.060**  0.091***  0.063*** 
  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
HCI -0.007 -0.034*** 0.004 -0.016*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
WPI  0.058***  0.057***  0.060***  0.058*** 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
Location 
dummy 
Y Y Y Y 
     
_cons 1.264*** 1.594*** 0.868*** 1.437*** 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.14) (0.09) 
N 4004 891 1661 3234 
Adj R2 0.359 0.378 0.291 0.373 
 
Notes: CCP – Chinese Communist Party. (1) ***, **, * at 1%, 5%, 10% significant levels, 
respectively. Figures within brackets are family-level clustered robust standard errors. (2) FR – 
Forced ruralisation; WA – Woman age; WS – Woman schooling (years); MO – Male offspring; OPS 
– Offspring at primary schooling age; OSH – Offspring with up to senior high schooling; HCI – 
Husband’s current year income; WPI – Woman previous year income. 
 
The results in Table 4 allow us to conclude the following: Firstly, family status 
does not change the general trend of female FRS victims’ labour market 
participation rate, which supports the robustness of our initial results. Secondly, 
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family status influenced the threshold for a change in direction of labour market 
participation. Women from “good families” switched direction in labour market 
participation at the age of 47.08 years, while those from “bad families” at 48.75 
years. Similarly, women with a party-member father switched direction in labour 
market participation at the age of 43.87 years, and the non-party farther group at 
the age of 49.25.  
 
Our view is that women’s individual ability is positively correlated to their 
personal determination to do well in life which in turn was determined by the 
intensity and duration of their FRS trauma, ceteris paribus. Women from bad and 
disloyal families have a longer working life because their greater sufferings under 
FRS. Those from “desirable families” suffered less and consequently had less 
desire to work.15 
 
Women with non-party parents having a longer working life despite the fact that 
the offspring of party members often possess greater personal ability supports our 
view that personal inner ability is a secondary factor compared with Mao’s 
external FRS shock. In other words, we attribute a longer female working life more 
to the FRS shock than personal ability. Clearly, women from “desirable families” 
suffered from FRS but they suffered less. They consequently worked less in later 
life. 
 
D.1.2. Further test on FRS peers 
We now take one step further to compare married couples who were free from FRS 
with (1) married couples with one spouse under FRS, and with (2) married couples 
both under FRS. It can be expected that married couples both under FRS 
demonstrate more impact from FRS. The results are shown in Table 6. 
                                                 
15 In other words, if the absence of the communist party membership can be seen as a proxy of a 
low ability of parents that can be inherited by their daughters, the non-party parent group’s higher 
labour participation rate suggests a learned ability from the FRS environment. 
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Table 6. Peer Comparisons 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Both FR One FR WLP WLP 
FR  0.826***  0.464*  0.518**  
  (0.25)  (0.26)  (0.23)  
FR•Age -0.017*** -0.010* -0.014***  
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  
WA -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
WS  0.023***  0.022***  0.022***  0.024*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
MO -0.010 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
OPS  0.075*  0.026  0.042  0.048 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
OSH  0.028*  0.026*  0.033**  0.036*** 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
HCI -0.014** -0.013** -0.013** -0.014** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
WPI  0.055***  0.055***  0.055***  0.055*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
FR•WS    0.013*  
    (0.01)  
FR•WPI    0.004  
    (0.01)  
DWFR     0.111*** 
     (0.04) 
FRD•Age    -0.002*** 
     (0.00) 
Location 
dummy 
Y Y Y Y 
_cons 1.786*** 1.828*** 1.802*** 1.797*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
N 2888 3315 3812 3812 
Adj R2 0.398 0.377 0.366 0.364 
 
Notes: (1) ***, **, * at 1%, 5%, 10% significant levels, respectively. Figures within brackets are 
family-level cluster robust standard errors. (2) FR – Forced ruralisation; WLP – Woman labour 
participation; WA – Woman age; WS – Woman schooling (years); MO – Male offspring; OPS – 
Offspring at primary schooling age; OSH – Offspring with up to senior high schooling; HCI – 
Husband’s current year income; WPI – Woman previous year income; DWFR – Duration of woman 
forced ruralisation. 
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Column (1) contains data for married couples who were both subject to FRS and 
married couples who were completely free from FRS; Column (2), families in which 
one spouse subject to FRS and married couples who were completely free from 
FRS. Regarding the threshold for a change in direction of labour market 
participation, the age was 48.59 years old for married couples who were both 
subject to FRS and 46.40 for families in which one spouse subject to FRS. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis,FRS made individuals work hard late in life. 
Column (3) takes into account the interplay between FRS and women’s education 
and income. The impact of FRS remains significant. Column (4) substitutes FR 
dummy with FRS duration and yields significant results, too. They confirm the 
robustness of our model. 
 
D.2. FRS and women’s contribution to family incomes  
We take women’s contribution to family incomes as a proxy for FRS impact on 
family life. To eliminate the influence of labour market participation, we use 
Heckman two-stage method, similar to Li et al. (2005), and hence come up with an 
estimation function: 
 
                      (2) 
Where  shows the income share of womani in her family income pool; , 
a dummy to indicate FRS experience of womani; X, a control variable that includes 
woman education (years), husband’s education (years), married couple’s age gap, 
child gender (boy = 1), child primary schooling (pre-school = 1), child up to senior 
high schooling (yes = 1), and a location dummy; , a random disturbance term.  
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Moreover, our selection equation as follows: 
 
                                   (3) 
 
Where  = 1, if womani has a job; = 0, if she does not; , a random 
disturbance term. Meanwhile, and X of Equation (2) serve as a subset 
of Equation (3). Table 7 contains regression results. 
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Table 7. Impact of FRS on Woman Contribution to Family Incomes 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variable OLS Heckman I  Heckman II   Heckman 
III 
     
FR  0.009**  0.013***  0.003***  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
WS  0.007*** -0.003***  0.000 -0.003*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
HS -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
CAG -0.001 -0.000  0.000 -0.000 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
MO  0.009***  0.008**  0.002**  0.007** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
OPS  0.002  0.001 -0.002  0.001 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
OSH -0.001 -0.012*** -0.004*** -0.012*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
WFRD     0.004*** 
     (0.00) 
Location 
dummy 
Y Y Y Y 
_cons  0.431***  0.596***  0.509***  0.596*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Rho 
 
sigma 
 
lambda 
 -0.992*** 
 (0.002) 
 0.091*** 
 (0.005) 
-0.091*** 
 (0.005) 
-0.871*** 
 (0.028) 
 0.022*** 
 (0.001) 
 0.020*** 
 (0.001) 
-0.992*** 
 (0.002) 
 0.091*** 
 (0.005) 
 0.091*** 
 (0.005) 
N 3812 3812 3783 3812 
Adj R2 0.038    
 
Notes: (1) ***, **, * at 1%, 5%, 10% significant levels, respectively. Figures within brackets are 
family-level clustered robust standard errors. (2) FR – Forced ruralisation; WS – Woman schooling 
(years); HS – husband’s schooling (years); CAG – Couple’s age gap; MO – Male offspring; OPS – 
Offspring at primary schooling age; OSH – Offspring with up to senior high schooling; WFRD – 
Woman forced ruralisation duration. 
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A few observations can be made here. First of all, with the conventional OLS 
method, Column (1) shows that FRS enhances female contribution to family 
incomes. Moreover, in terms of the control variable, female contribution to family 
incomes is positively related to women’s own education but negatively related to 
their husbands’; mothers of boys also have a larger share in family incomes.  
 
Second, with the Heckman method for likelihood ratio test, Column (2) rejects the 
assumption of mutual independence between aforementioned Equations (2) and 
(3) (P = 0.00) to justify our choice of the sample. Our Heckman results indicate 
that the impact of FRS on female contribution to family incomes is significant and 
on the rise. It is also clear that female labour market participation rate is a 
separated issue. Moreover, Column (3) shows four-year average female family 
income contribution and Heckman two-stage regression to eliminate macro-
economic impact on women’s incomes. The impact of FRS on female contribution 
to family incomes is still significant. 
 
Thirdly, Column (4) substitutes the FRS dummy with duration of FRS for female 
individuals, the result again is significant. So, our income contribution results are 
robust.  
 
Early studies suggest that family income contribution is a benchmark for female 
bargaining power in a household (Bertrand, 2015; Qi Liangshu, 2005). Factor FRS 
in, we see women subject to FRS obtain more competitiveness not only in society 
but also inside their families à la Booth et al. (2018). FRS thus enhanced women’s 
position inside their families. 
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D.3. FRS and changes in personal qualities 
We now examine the weight of FRS on changes in personal qualities (Gong et al., 
2017). Our data come from “Chinese General Social Survey 2006”. We examine the 
population cohort who were born from 1937 to 1966 to match our earlier data 
choice. The factors for our consideration are fate, birth place, family wealth, 
intellect, ambition and endeavour. The first three factors are things that the 
surveyee has no control over; and the last three show surveyees’ personal 
inspiration and effort. The surveyee was asked to rank from 1 to 5. The lower the 
rank, the higher the weight of the factor.  
 
Our key explanatory variable is FRS. We use a number of characteristic variables 
(age, own education, and ruling party membership), family data (number of 
siblings, parents’ education and ruling party membership), and a location dummy. 
The regression is run with an ordered probit model. 
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Table 8. FRS on Changes in Woman Belief System 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Fate Birth 
place 
Family 
wealth 
Intellect Ambition Endeavour 
FR -0.009 -0.084  0.120** -0.128** -0.158** -0.124** 
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Edu -0.002  0.011**  0.005 -0.003 -0.005  0.001 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Age  0.001  0.009***  0.008***  0.001 -0.000  0.001 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Gender  0.092***  0.006 -0.007  0.019 -0.022 -0.024 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
PM  0.087*  0.062  0.122**  0.043 -0.017  0.023 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Eth -0.083 -0.026  0.047 -0.382*** -0.278*** -0.287*** 
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
UR -0.224*** -0.044  0.005 -0.153*** -0.148*** -0.166*** 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Emp  0.052  0.056  0.043 -0.055 -0.049 -0.029 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Sblg  0.005  0.001  0.001 -0.003  0.005  0.014* 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
FS  0.009** -0.005  0.004 -0.002  0.001  0.003 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
FPM -0.046  0.124*  0.040 -0.017 -0.118* -0.081 
  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
MS -0.015***  0.004 -0.009  0.001 -0.001 -0.009 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
MPM  0.050  0.059  0.015  0.175 -0.234 -0.143 
  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.14) 
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Location 
dummy 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N  5722  5722  5722  5722  5722  5722 
Pseudo 
R2   
 0.0279  0.0267  0.0280  0.0358  0.0387  0.0059 
 
Notes: Notes: (1) ***, **, * at 1%, 5%, 10% significant levels, respectively. Figures within 
brackets are robust standard errors. (2) FR – Forced ruralisation; Edu – Education (years); PM – 
Ruling party membership; Eth – Ethnicity; UR – Urban residence; Emp – Employment; Sblg – 
number of siblings; FS – Father’s schooling; FPM – Father with ruling party membership; MS – 
Mother’s schooling; MPM – Mother with ruling party membership.  
 
Results in Table 8 demonstrate that although fate and birth place have no much 
weight the FRS group values intellect, ambition and endeavour higher than the 
non-FRS group. The FRS group also sees less importance in family wealth than 
its non-FRS counterpart. For both groups. Such results are similar to observations 
made by Gong et al. (2017) and Booth et al. (2018). 
 
D.4. Comparison with male FRS victims 
Finally, we compare male FRS victims with their female counterparts to see any 
difference. Table 9 shows that FRS has no significant impact on either male labour 
market participation or male contribution to family incomes. If true, the impact of 
FRS trauma seems female specific.  
 
Table 9. Impact of FRS on Male Labour Market Participation Rate and Contribution to 
Family Incomes 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Labour 
participation 
Labour 
participation 
Income 
contribution 
Income 
contribution 
FR -0.215   0.003  
  (0.16)   (0.00)  
FR•Age  0.006*    
  (0.00)    
DFR  -0.020   0.001 
   (0.04)   (0.00) 
DFR•Age   0.001   
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   (0.00)   
Age -0.030*** -0.030***   
  (0.00)  (0.00)   
MS  0.003  0.004* -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
WS    0.007***  0.007*** 
    (0.00)  (0.00) 
CAG   -0.004*** -0.004*** 
    (0.00)  (0.00) 
MO    0.006*  0.006* 
    (0.00)  (0.00) 
OPS -0.012 -0.015  0.005  0.005 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
OSH -0.005 -0.007  0.005  0.005 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
MPI  0.076***  0.076***   
  (0.01)  (0.01)   
WI -0.006* -0.006*   
  (0.00)  (0.00)   
Location 
dummy 
Y Y Y Y 
_cons  1.630***  1.625***  0.397***  0.397*** 
  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
N  3812  3812  3812  3812 
Adj R2  0.334  0.332   
 
Notes: (1) ***, **, * at 1%, 5%, 10% significant levels, respectively. Figures within brackets are 
robust standard errors. (2) FR – Forced ruralisation; DFR – Duration of FR; MS – Male schooling 
(years); WS – Wife’s schooling; CAG – Spouse age gap; MO – Male offspring; OPS – Offspring at 
primary schooling age; OSH – Offspring with up to senior high schooling; MPI – Male previous 
year’s income; WI – Wife’s income. 
 
A sensible explanation is that husbands have been breadwinners both during and 
after Mao’s rule. Women’s employment is traditionally optional. They may have 
been forced to work under Mao (Pan Jintang, 2002), but are able to exit the labour 
market in the post-Mao era (Peng Qingqing, 2017). In contrast, China’s traditional 
family labour distribution makes males unable to exit the labour market freely. 
Therefore, FRS has had less influence on male labour participation ex post. If 
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women have more choices but still work for income, FRS must be partly 
responsible. 
 
 
E. Final conclusions 
Mao’s FRS was a force majeure for innocent individuals in urban China. It brought 
unnecessary hardships and suffering upon over 10 million young victims who were 
school-age adolescents. The only reason for these teenagers to be “sent down to the 
countryside” was because they were urban. 
 
However, decades later, the externalities of Mao’s fatuous and absurd policy show 
made female victims motivated to turn their misfortunes around successfully. It 
is all about self-esteem and personal determination to do well after the force 
majeure. The unintended consequence has turned out to be a gain in female 
emancipation. This in our view is the best revenge on the tyranny of Mao’s 
dictatorship. 
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